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1. Introduction 
 
Nowhere in the world has the phenomenon of regionalism started earlier 
than in Europe and it comes to nobody’s surprise that the European Union 
(EU) is not only the most prominent but also the most highly integrated 
regional trade agreement (RTA) currently existing. Its roots stretch back to the 
early 1950s when it had its embryonic stage as the European Coal and Steel 
Community followed by its birth in 1957 with the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Rome. Starting life as a customs union, its childhood name, European 
Economic Community (EEC), was soon changed to the shorter European 
Community (EC) reflecting the fact that its aim was not limited to economic 
integration.  
The EC’s teenage years were marked by considerable growth (several 
countries joined in the 1970s and 80s). With the conclusion of the Single 
European Act in 1987, the EC finally came of age: it completed the formation 
of the common market in which goods, services, capital and labour could flow 
freely. After another name change, it set up a framework for the creation of the 
Euro and the harmonisation of fiscal and social policies. In the 1990s and 
2000s, the EU continued to grow (Eastern enlargement) and get more 
integrated (conclusion of Schengen, implementation of the common currency). 
Undoubtedly a success story of regionalism, the EU
1 has never stopped 
deepening economic integration and expanding membership. It constitutes, 
therefore, a unique natural experiment to test the domino theory of regionalism 
(Baldwin, 1993). This theory states that the conclusion of a new RTA or the 
deepening of an existing one will induce non-members to join the RTA like 
falling dominoes. Put differently, RTAs are inherently dynamic and have a 
tendency to enlarge their membership. The underlying reason is that 
regionalism has negative economic effects on non-members, which now face 
discrimination in the markets covered by the RTA
2  
This paper assesses whether empirical evidence supports the domino 
theory by analysing the EU experience from the 1960s until today. As 
mentioned above, the process of deepening economic integration among EU 
members provides a natural experiment for the domino theory. Any natural 
experiment not only has a treatment group, which is thought to be affected by a 
particular policy change (in our case the EU member countries), but also a 
control group, which is not affected by this policy change. Our control group 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, the term EU includes former designations such as EEC and EC. 
2 Section 2 examines the domino theory in more detail.   - 3 -
includes industrial countries outside the EU and we will have a particular look 
at EFTA members. 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) came into existence in 
1960, shortly after the EU, offering an alternative approach to European 
integration.
3 Indeed, the two European RTAs differ from each other in 
important aspects: 
(1)  Unlike the EU, which is a customs union (CU) with a common 
external tariff, EFTA is a free trade agreement (FTA) whose 
members are free to maintain or modify independently their 
external tariff structure. A country joining a CU may even have to 
increase its tariffs for some trading partners when adopting the 
common external tariff. As a result, CUs typically lead to higher 
trade diversion than FTAs. 
(2)  A second difference refers to the two RTAs extra-commercial and 
political aspirations. Our short historical excursion above has shown 
that the EU soon started to go beyond pure trade aspects to achieve 
a highly integrated economic and political union among 
participating states. EFTA, on the other hand, is a traditional trade 
agreement with the sole ambition of removing barriers to trade in 
industrial goods (agriculturals and fisheries are excluded). 
(3)  A major innovation of the EU is its supra-national character 
reflected in institutions such as the Commission, the Parliament and 
the Court of Justice. EFTA does not offer anything comparable; the 
only organ is the EFTA Council composed of member country 
representatives meeting at delegation or ministerial level.
4 
Furthermore, the EFTA secretariat (staff of around 100 people) is 
very small compared with the EU bureaucracy in Brussels. 
(4)  Regarding enlargement, the picture looks completely different from 
that of the EU. The only country joining EFTA was Iceland in 
1970.
5 By contrast, several countries left EFTA to join the EU: 
Denmark and the United Kingdom in 1973; Portugal in 1985; 
Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995. EFTA membership decreased 
                                                 
3 EFTA was founded by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
UK. Shortly afterwards, Finland and Liechtenstein became associate members. 
4 Note that the Council may establish Committees composed of experts from member 
countries. These Committees are not empowered to make legally binding decisions; their main 
function is to advise the Council in technical matters of running EFTA. 
5 Strictly speaking, there were two other accession countries: Finland in 1986 and Liechtenstein 
in 1991. Both countries, however, had been linked to EFTA through an association agreement 
since 1961. (For Finland, full membership was no option in the 1960s due to objections from 
the Soviet Union).   - 4 -
from 10 countries
6 in the early 1970s to only 4 countries today 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). 
To cut a long story short, this paper will test the appropriateness of the 
domino theory for explaining the growing importance of the EU and the 
decline in importance of EFTA. Our analysis is carried out in two stages. Stage 
one examines whether the expansion and deepening of the EU had a negative 
impact on non-members. It is shown that the EU was more attractive due to its 
higher degree of trade diversion, which is a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition for domino effects.
7 Stage two assesses the importance of variables 
reflecting domino effects relative to control variables capturing other possible 
determinants of EU expansion. This exercise provides sufficient evidence 
supporting the domino theory. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys the 
literature on the trade effects of European RTAs. Section  3 uses a gravity 
equation to measure the effects of the EU and EFTA on trade patterns. 
Section  4 estimates a discrete choice model to evaluate the importance of 
domino effects for EU expansion. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6 Including associate members Finland and Liechtenstein. 
7 Trade diversion is not a sufficient proof of domino effects for the following reason: finding a 
significant degree of trade diversion only demonstrates that an RTA has a negative impact on 
non-members. However, we also need to check whether trade diversion (and other variables 
related to the domino theory) is indeed an important factor in a country’s accession decision.   - 5 -
2. Literature  Review 
 
2.1  The Domino Theory of Regionalism 
 
The domino theory builds on Viner’s (1950) observation that any RTA 
leads to trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation refers to the increase 
in trade among members of an RTA thanks to the elimination of tariffs on 
intra-regional trade. Trade diversion denotes the RTA-caused shift from an 
efficient (lower cost) outside supplier to a less efficient (higher cost) regional 
one. For a long time, the debate on trade creation versus trade diversion was 
confined to the static level ignoring dynamic time path issues. Put differently, 
expansion of membership to RTAs was simply treated as exogenous 
(Greenaway, 2000). 
Only at the beginning of the 1990s, researchers began to think about 
regionalism as a dynamic process. Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory is the first 
formal model to analyse the implications of trade diversion on membership in a 
particular RTA. Its basic assumption is that national trade policies are 
endogenous: they result from a political equilibrium balancing demand and 
supply of protection. With respect to regional trade agreements, the policy of a 
particular government reflects the relative power of pro-membership forces 
(i.e. firms exporting to the regional bloc) compared to anti-membership forces.  
The conclusion of a new RTA or the deepening of an existing one implies 
a loss of competitiveness and lower profits for non-member firms exporting to 
the regional bloc because they face entry barriers that members do not. As a 
consequence, these firms increase their pro-membership lobbying efforts, 
changing the political equilibrium in their countries. The country whose 
government was closest to being indifferent to membership will then join the 
RTA. This further enlargement of the bloc increases the costs for non-members 
as the number of rivals with preferential market access has grown. As this 
cycle continues, additional countries will join like falling dominoes. 
The domino cycle only continues if the RTA in question is open and any 
country requesting membership is admitted. In other words, the domino theory 
assumes that “the supply of membership is perfectly elastic” (Baldwin, 1993, 
p. 29). This basic framework has been extended in several subsequent studies. 
Focusing on customs unions (CUs), Yi (1996) takes a closer look at the 
difference between CUs that are open to non-member countries and those with 
exclusive membership. Yi’s central message is that while open CUs are 
stepping stones toward global free trade, exclusive CUs may become stumbling 
blocks against global free trade. In a recent theoretical development, Aghion,   - 6 -
Antràs and Helpman (2004) show that global free trade is the unique 
equilibrium outcome if the aggregate welfare under global free trade is higher 
than under any combination of bilateral and regional trade agreements.
8 
 
2.2  Empirical Assessments of the EU and EFTA 
 
Gravity models have been used extensively to analyse the impact of 
RTAs on trade flows. Most of the studies, however, focus on the static effects 
of RTAs. An early example is Aitken (1973), which looks at Western European 
trade flows from 1951-1967. Using a gravity equation with dummies for each 
RTA, he examines year-by-year OLS estimates to assess the impact of the EEC 
and EFTA on trade flows. His results show significantly positive coefficients 
for both the EEC and EFTA dummies as of 1961 and 1964 respectively. These 
coefficients provide a measure of the factor by which intra-RTA trade has been 
increased as a result of the formation of the EEC and EFTA. The increase in 
the RTA coefficients in the years after formation of the EEC and EFTA 
respectively can be interpreted as evidence for trade creation among member 
countries. This effect was substantially larger for the EEC than EFTA. 
For a long time, Aitken’s (1973) article was the only one evaluating the 
trade effects of RTAs. At the beginning of the 1990s, the number of RTAs 
negotiated started to increase dramatically, which stimulated interest in the 
economic effects of regionalism. The most preferred tool for these analyses 
was the gravity model, known for its remarkable performance in empirical 
research. The fact that its theoretical underpinnings had been strengthened in 
the 1980s further enhanced its popularity. 
Unsurprisingly, most research focused on Europe, where regionalism is 
deeper than elsewhere. Furthermore European economic integration goes back 
to the 1950s and since then, has seen several enlargements, offering a terrific 
playground for testing different hypotheses empirically. Frankel and Wei 
(1993), for instance, perform an Aitken-type cross-section gravity analysis for 
1965-1990. They find that countries which are members to the same RTA trade 
more with each other than would be expected taking into account their 
economic size and distance. According to Frankel’s and Wei’s estimates, a 
country joining the EEC in 1980 would have experienced a 68% increase in 
trade with other members by 1990. As for EFTA, they do not find any 
significant trade creating effect. 
                                                 
8 If the aggregate welfare under global free trade is lower than under a trade system with 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, global free trade may only occur under particular 
circumstances such as presence of trade diversion.   - 7 -
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) look at European regionalism from 
1956-1992 using a first-differenced gravity equation to avoid the omitted 
variables problem: When estimating a simple cross-section gravity framework, 
the coefficients on RTA dummies will pick up any time-constant country-
specific characteristics that are not controlled for in the gravity equation. A 
first-differenced equation eliminates this problem and leads to unbiased 
coefficient estimates. Bayoumi and Eichengreen find that both EEC and EFTA 
had a significant impact on trade flows, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. 
More recently, research started going beyond static issues and began to 
address the question whether regionalism spreads in a domino-like fashion 
resulting in RTAs growing and multiplying. The first attempt to test the 
domino theory for Western Europe is Sapir (2001). Using year-by-year OLS 
estimates of a standard gravity equation, he finds supporting evidence for the 
idea that domino effects played an important role in several rounds of EEC/EU 
enlargement. He pays particular attention to EFTA members and the evolution 
of the coefficient of the EFTA dummy variable. Until the mid-1970s, this 
coefficient remains insignificantly positive indicating that EFTA was rather 
successful in countering the EEC agreement. However, when two former 
EFTA members (UK and Denmark) and Ireland join the EEC in 1973, the 
EFTA coefficient gradually changes from positive to negative, but remains not 
significantly different from zero. Towards the end of the 1980s, the EFTA 
dummy becomes significantly negative indicating the detrimental effect trade 
of the EC’s Single Market Programme on EFTA. According to Sapir, this 
prompted several EFTA members to apply for EC membership in the early 
1990s. Unfortunately, his analysis stops in 1992, one year before the Single 
Market effectively enters into force. 
Building on Sapir (2001), the subsequent parts of this paper address the 
question of domino effects in Western Europe. However, we will  
(1)  extend the sample period until 2004 to cover the years when the 
Single Market fully exerts its effects; 
(2)  increase the sample size by including non-European OECD 
countries to enlarge the control group; 
(3)  adopt a refined methodology, using panel data techniques to take 
into account the information given by the time structure; 
(4)  develop the analysis further with a discrete choice model to assess 
the importance of domino variables compared to other factors. 
 
   - 8 -
3.  Measuring the Extent of Trade Diversion in Europe 
 
3.1  Conceptual and Methodological Framework 
 
To test the domino theory empirically, we need a tool to analyse 
European trade flows. For over forty years, the gravity model has been 
successfully applied in econometric research to model bilateral trade flows. 
The basic idea is borrowed from Newton’s Law of Gravity in physical 
sciences: the gravitational attraction between two objects depends positively on 
their mass and negatively on the distance separating them. By analogy, 
bilateral trade between two countries is a function of their economic mass and 
the distance between them. This is intuitively plausible; bigger countries 
located closer to one another will most probably trade more with each other. 
 
a)  A Theoretically Founded Gravity Equation 
 
Despite the relatively long tradition of estimating gravity models as a 
basis for explaining trade flows, theoretical aspects were for a long time 
neglected. As a result, there was no formal framework representing the role of 
technology, factor endowments or any other determinants of trade. It was even 
frequently claimed that the gravity model could not be derived from any of the 
dominant theoretical trade models such as Heckscher-Ohlin. 
The first successful attempt to prove these critics wrong dates back to 
1979 (Anderson, 1979). Subsequent research by various authors has sought to 
reinforce the theoretical foundations of the gravity model by deriving it from 
different trade models, including Ricardian (Eaton and Kortum, 2001), 
Heckscher-Ohlin (Deardorff, 1995) and increasing returns to scale models 
(Helpman and Krugman, 1985). 
Under the assumption of trade in differentiated products and using a CES 
demand function, Baldwin (2005) derives the following microfounded gravity 
equation: 
  
t d t o
t od








Equation [1] states that at time t, the total value of trade from country o 
(Origin) to country d (Destination) equals Origin’s GDP (Yo,t) times   - 9 -
Destination’s GDP (Yd,t) times a distance and remoteness term (









−  a variable capturing trade costs between Origin and Destination:  τod,t 
−  constant elasticity of substitution between varieties:   σ 
(Note that σ > 1). 
−  a measure of Origin’s market access:   Ωo,t 
−  a measure of Destination’s openness:   Δd,t  
The distance and remoteness term reflects bilateral relative openness:  
(1)  The numerator can be interpreted as openness that is specific to the 
bilateral relationship between Origin and Destination. Since trade 
costs are raised to a negative power, the term gets larger as bilateral 
barriers to trade are lowered (in other words, when bilateral trade 
becomes more open).  
(2)  The denominator can be interpreted as general openness: it contains 
both Origin’s general market access Ωo,t (in other words, the 
world’s openness to the exporting country’s varieties) and 
Destination’s openness to the world Δd,t. 
  Equation [1] is the basis for the econometric analysis in this section. By 
applying this gravity equation to Western Europe from 1962 to 2004, we assess 
the impact of the EU and EFTA on bilateral trade. In line with the literature, 
we log-linearise equation [1]. 
  t d t o t od t d t o t od Y Y T , , , , , , ln ln ln ) 1 ( ln ln ln Δ − Ω − − + + = τ σ  [2] 
  Many gravity models include both GDP and GDP per capita. Such a 
specification can be derived from a model combining Heckscher-Ohlin inter-
industry trade and monopolistic competition intra-industry trade (Bergstrand, 
1989). From an econometric point of view, including GDP per capita is 
equivalent to relating bilateral trade flows to GDP and population: 
  t d t o t d t o t od pop pop Y Y T , , , , , ln ln ln ln ln + + + =  
   t d t o t od , , , ln ln ln ) 1 ( Δ − Ω − − + τ σ  [3] 
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  The correct econometric specification of this gravity equation is: 
 
  t d t o t d t o t od t od pop pop Y Y T , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , ln ln ln ln ln β β β β λ α + + + + + =  
   t od t d t o t od , , 7 , 6 , 5 ln ln ln ε β β τ β + Δ + Ω + +  [4] 
where: 
  Tod,t :  value of total trade from Origin to Destination at time t 
  Yo,t :  Origin’s GDP at time t (the same for Yd,t for Destination) 
  popo,t :  number of inhabitants in Origin at time t (the same for popd,t) 
  τod,t :  a variable capturing trade costs between Origin and Destination 
  Ωo,t :  a measure of Origin’s market access 
  Δd,t :  a measure of Destination’s openness 
  αod :  bilateral effect (country-pair specific effect) 
  λt :  time-specific effect 
  εod,t :  white noise disturbance term 
 
 
b)  Problems with Simple Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
  Typically, previous studies have adopted a cross-sectional approach: 
Equation [4] is estimated by OLS for each year or by pooling these cross-
sections across time. Formally this implies that αod = 0 and λt = 0. 
Unfortunately, both methods are likely to provide biased estimates because 
they fail to account for heterogeneity in trade relations among countries. In the 
theoretically grounded gravity equation, this heterogeneity is captured by τ, Ω, 
and Δ, which reflect bilateral relative openness.  
  Bilateral relative openness is determined by political, cultural, historical 
and geographic factor which cannot be readily observed. Usually, bilateral 
relative openness is controlled for by including distance, a dummy variable 
indicating whether the trade flow takes place under an RTA and a number of 
other dummy variables in a gravity equation like: 
  t d t o t d t o t od pop pop Y Y T , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , ln ln ln ln ln β β β β β + + + + =  
   t od k k t od od dummy RTA dist , , 6 5 ln ε γ β β + + + + ∑  [5] 
  A positive and significant estimate for β6 is interpreted as indicating the 
extent to which a particular RTA influences international trade relations. 
However,  β6 and all other coefficients are biased due to omitted variables, 
measurement errors and simultaneity.   - 11 -
  As mentioned, the determinants of bilateral relative openness are difficult 
to observe and quantify. Many variables one should control for will, therefore, 
not be included in the equation and are relegated into the error term. Since 
many of these omitted variables are correlated with the explanatory variables 
(for instance unobservable political factors are likely to influence whether an 
RTA between two countries exists), OLS coefficient estimates will be biased. 
  Measurement errors are also likely to play a major role. For example, the 
question how to correctly measure economic distance is a matter of great 
discussion.
9 The most common measure (air distance between the economic 
centres) may cause problems if some countries have several equally important 
cities that are far apart (e.g. New York, Chicago and Los Angeles for the US). 
In addition, some authors argue that distance should not enter in absolute but in 
relative terms (Greenaway and Milner, 2002). In other words, absolute distance 
does not account for the fact that some countries have a much lower average 
distance to their trading partners than others. 
 As  for  simultaneity, several explanatory variables are potentially 
endogenous to bilateral trade flows. Magee (2003) shows that RTAs are more 
likely among countries with high bilateral trade, which may cause an upward 
bias in the coefficient estimates of RTA dummies. The most obvious remedy 
would be instrumental variable (IV) techniques. However, several authors 
claim that it is highly unlikely that appropriate instruments exist and that even 
IV methods will provide biased estimates (Baier and Bergstrand, 2005; 
Baldwin, 2005). 
 
c)  Fixed versus Random Effects 
 
  An elegant way of mitigating the bias caused by omitted variables, 
measurement errors and simultaneity is to use panel data techniques. Previous 
gravity estimations differ in whether fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) 
models were adopted. Our panel estimation applies fixed effects rather than 
random effects because we are not estimating trade flows between a randomly 
drawn sample of countries but between a predetermined selection of countries. 
  There are also good econometric reasons for this choice: fixed effects 
methods provide consistent results even if the unobservable factors are 
correlated with one or several explanatory variables. However, the estimates 
may not always be most efficient. Random effects estimate more efficient 
coefficients than fixed, but this method rests upon the assumption of zero 
                                                 
9 See, for instance, Cheng and Wall (2005)   - 12 -
correlation between unobservable effects and explanatory variables. As we 
have seen above, this is highly unlikely in the context of a gravity model. 
  This conclusion has been tested empirically by Egger (2000) on the basis 
of a Hausman test, which compares a more efficient model (in our case RE) 
against a less efficient but consistent model (in our case FE) to ascertain that 
the more efficient model (RE) also gives consistent results. In Egger’s analysis, 
the highly significant Hausman statistic indicates that the fixed effects model is 
consistent, but random effects not.
10 
  From a practical point of view, fixed effects have the advantage of 
eliminating complicated data issues, such as which measure to use for distance 
or how to quantify political factors. Since most of these unobservables are 
constant either on the time, country or country-pair dimension, they are simply 
absorbed by the fixed effects. 
 
3.2  Data and Specifications  
 
a) Data  Issues 
 
  We analyse two unbalanced panels containing data on bilateral trade, 
GDP, population, and participation in the EU and EFTA. The difference 
between these two panels lies in whether bilateral trade flows are unidirectional 
or averaged. The unidirectional panel (22  957 observations) distinguishes 
between trade flows from country A to B and flows from B to A. The averaged 
panel (12 245 observations) does not take into account the direction of trade 
flows and simply calculates the average of A to B and B to A flows. 
  Both ways to account for bilateral trade have their advantages and 
drawbacks. Unidirectional trade flows allow for a more detailed analysis. In 
particular, we are able to estimate the degree of trade diversion caused by 
either EU or EFTA. A potential problem with unidirectional trade flows may 
arise because exchange rate movements are not considered in our gravity 
model even though changes in the bilateral exchange rate have an impact on 
countries’ exports by increasing or decreasing competitiveness. Averaged 
bilateral trade flows impose the assumption of balanced trade and, thus, 
mitigate the effect of exchange rate movements on exports.
11 With averaged 
                                                 
10 For more details on the econometrics of fixed and random effects models, see Wooldridge 
(2002), chapter 10. 
11 Some caution is required when averaging trade flows. One should first calculate the logs of 
each of the two flows and then take the average. Those wrongly calculating the log of the 
average commit the “silver medal mistake” (Baldwin, 2005).   - 13 -
trade flows, however, we lose information on the direction of the flows and are, 
in consequence, unable to assess the impact of the EU and EFTA on non-
members exports to the particular trade bloc. The solution adopted in this paper 
is to run regressions on both panels. The unidirectional results are used to draw 
conclusions on the extent of trade diversion in Europe, while the results from 
the averaged panel regressions serve as a benchmark to make sure that 
exchange rate competitiveness effects do not distort the picture too much. 
  Both panels cover the period from 1962 to 2004 (43 years) for 26 OECD 
countries. These are all OECD members without the four Central European 
countries Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republic. The reason for 
excluding these nations is that for most of the period analysed, they belonged 
to the communist bloc with the consequence that trade data is unavailable for a 
large part of the period. Another reason is that even accounting for time and 
country-pair fixed effects, there would still be scope for omitted variables 
because unobservable factors influencing relations among country-pairs are 
changing.
12  
  As suggested by the theoretically founded gravity model examined 
above, we use nominal (current US$) data for trade flows and GDP.
13 With 
respect to trade flows, import data was extracted from the UN Comtrade 
database using WITS (World Integrated Trade Solutions).
14 Data on GDP and 
population comes from the World Bank Development Indicators database.
 15 
 
b)  Fixed Effects Specifications 
 
  The first specification estimated is a gravity equation with country-
specific (αo, αd) and year (λt) fixed effects. Note that there are two specific 
effects for each country, one as an importer and another as an exporter.  
 lnTodt =   αo + αd + λt + β1lnGDPot + β2lnGDPdt + β3lnPOPot + β4lnPOPdt 
   +  β5EUÙEUodt + β6NonEUÖEUodt + εodt    [6] 
                                                 
12 This is an issue for all countries. However, it is more important in the case of bilateral 
relations with countries that change from a communist to a free market regime at some point 
during the time period. 
13 The reason why nominal data (as opposed to real) should be used is discussed in  
Baldwin (2005) 
14 On the choice between import or export data, Baldwin (1994) notes that it is more common 
to use import data as countries presumably watch their imports more thoroughly than their 
exports. 
15 See Appendix A for a complete list of countries analysed as well as more information on 
data sources.   - 14 -
  In equation [6], EUÙEUodt is a binary variable indicating whether a 
particular trade flow occurs between two EU members. The coefficient (β5) 
shows how important the particular RTA is in shaping trade patterns. A second 
dummy is NonEUÖEUodt indicating exports from non-EU members to EU 
countries; its coefficient (β6) reveals trade diversion. Using the vocabulary 
from medical research, this equation looks at the treatment group (EU 
members) in comparison to the control group (EFTA members and countries 
that are in neither RTA). 
  The second specification (equation [7]) also has country-specific and year 
fixed effects; however, the two EU dummies are replaced with EFTA 
dummies. Hence, we now look at EFTA members while the EU and other 
countries are in the control group. 
 lnTodt =   αo + αd + λt + β1lnGDPot + β2lnGDPdt + β3lnPOPot + β4lnPOPdt 
   +  β5EFTAÙEFTAodt + β6NonEFTAÖEFTAodt + εodt [7] 
  The third specification (equation [8]) is similar to the first one but instead 
of country-specific fixed effects, we apply country-pair-specific effects (αod). 
 lnTodt =   αod + λt + β1lnGDPot + β2lnGDPdt + β3lnPOPot + β4lnPOPdt 
   +  β5EUÙEUodt + β6NonEUÖEUodt + εodt    [8] 
  Like equation [7], the fourth specification (equation [9]) looks at EFTA, 
but with country-pair-specific effects. 
 lnTodt =   αod + λt + β1lnGDPot + β2lnGDPdt + β3lnPOPot + β4lnPOPdt 
   +  β5EFTAÙEFTAodt + β6NonEFTAÖEFTAodt + εodt [9] 
  In line with the theory of gravity models depicted above, we would 
expect the GDP coefficients to be positive as economically larger countries 
will trade more. The sign of the population coefficients, however, is a little less 
clear cut. On the one hand, we would anticipate a negative coefficient 
reflecting the fact that bigger countries with a large home market and a high 
level of self-sufficiency will trade less than countries with a smaller population 
(Nilsson, 2000). On the other hand, we could expect a positive coefficient 
because “a large population also promotes division of labour and implies the 
presence of economies of scale in production and therefore also of 
opportunities and desire to trade with a greater variety of goods” (Nilsson, 
2000, p. 812). Therefore, a positive sign would suggest that intra-industry trade 
is important, while a negative sign would indicate the prevalence of inter-
industry (Heckscher-Ohlin) trade.   - 15 -
  As for the sign of the EUÙEU ( EFTAÙEFTA) coefficient, a 
significantly positive estimate would imply that the EU (EFTA) had a 
considerable effect on trade patterns among OECD countries. The NonEUÖEU 
(NonEFTAÖEFTA) coefficient shows the extent of trade diversion due to the 
EU (EFTA). The more negative the coefficient, the more negative the impact 
of the EU (EFTA) on non-members exports. A significant degree of trade 
diversion is a necessary condition for domino effects as exporters in non-
member countries need to be in a less advantageous position than producers 




  Table 1 presents the results of fixed effects regressions on equations [6] 
to [9] using the unidirectional panel. Since there is clear evidence of 
heteroskedasticity, White-corrected (robust) standard errors are reported.
16 
  In common with other empirical literature using gravity equations, the 
explanatory power of all models is good (high R
2); the included variables 
explain between 85 and 95 percent of the variation of OECD trade flows. The 
GDP coefficients have the expected signs (significantly positive); an increase 
in a country’s GDP causes a slightly more-than-proportional increase in its 
imports and exports. The estimates for the population coefficients are mostly 
positive and significant confirming the intra-industry hypothesis, which states 
that larger nations trade more because they benefit from higher economies of 
scale and thus have opportunities to exchange a greater variety of goods. This 
seems reasonable for our sample, which only includes only OECD countries, 
which have a reputation of trading mainly at intra-industry level. 
  In addition to the unidirectional panel, regressions were run on the 
averaged panel to get an idea of the impact of exchange rate movements. These 
results are presented in Appendix C. A comparison of the coefficient estimates 
of the regressions on both panels suggests that it does not make a huge 
difference whether the averaged or the unidirectional panel is used.
17 This 
suggests that, on average over the whole period, exchange rate movements may 
have exerted a less important impact on trade among OECD countries than is 
usually thought. 
  With regards to the dummy coefficients, the results conform largely to 
expectations. Significantly positive coefficient estimates for the EUÙEU and 
 
                                                 
16 Appendix B offers a more detailed treatment of the issue of heteroskedasticity in our model. 
17 Frankel (2005) comes to the same conclusion: it does not make much difference whether one 
analyses unidirectional or averaged trade flows.   - 16 -






























































































Number of observations  22 957  22 957  22 957  22 957 
R
2  0.8564 0.8527  0.9596 0.9587 
Adjusted R
2  0.8558 0.8521  0.9585 0.9575 
Root  MSE  1.0026 1.0155  0.5378 0.5441 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets. 
 
EFTAÙEFTA dummies indicate that both EU and EFTA play a role in shaping 
trade patterns. This is true for the regression with country-specific fixed effects 
as well as for the regression with pair-specific fixed effects. However, the 
impact of the EU and EFTA turns out to be larger in the models using country-
specific effects and the effect of EU and EFTA appears to be similar in 
magnitude. On average over the period, intra-EU and intra-EFTA trade is   - 17 -
estimated to be around 2 times larger than non-preferential trade.
18 Using pair-
specific fixed effects, estimates are generally smaller and there is a clear 
difference in the extent to which the EU influences trade patterns compared to 
EFTA. Intra-EU trade is on average around 35% larger than non-preferential 
trade, whereas intra-EFTA trade out-performs non-preferential trade only by 
around 10%.
19 Whether country-specific or pair-specific effects are preferred is 
discussed further below. 
  The results in Table 1 are useful to determine the degree of trade 
diversion that can be ascribed to EU and EFTA. The NonEUÖEU  and 
NonEFTAÖEFTA coefficient show how exports from non-members to EU or 
EFTA countries differ from exports to countries outside the EU or EFTA. 
More precisely, a significantly negative dummy coefficient hints at non-
negligible trade diversion due to the EU or EFTA. Looking at the estimates for 
the models with country-specific effects (equations  [6] and [7]), we detect 
considerable trade diversion caused by the EU and EFTA. On average over the 
period, exports from non-EU countries to EU members were around 30% 
smaller than exports to countries that are not in the EU. For EFTA, trade 
diversion is reflected by a 20% decrease in exports from non-members to the 
EFTA.
20 In the models with pair-specific effects (equations [8] and [9]), the 
estimates are smaller, but the NonEUÖEU coefficient is still significantly 
negative indicating that the EU caused trade diversion of over 10%.
21 At the 
same time, EFTA did not create significant trade diversion; the 
NonEFTAÖEFTA coefficient is positive but insignificant at the 10% level. In 
sum, Table 1 confirms the hypothesis that the EU caused more trade diversion 
than EFTA.  
 
a) Country-Specific  versus  Pair-Specific Fixed Effects 
 
  It is still an open question, whether the coefficients from the country or 
pair-specific regression are more appropriate. With pair-specific effects, we 
obtain estimates that are smaller and more reasonable than with country-
specific effects. The literature is divided on the issue; some advocate using 
country-specific effects (Mátyás, 1997; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2001), 
others prefer country-pair-specific effects (Cheng and Wall, 2005; Holmes, 
2005). From a conceptual point of view, the pair-specific model is preferred 
                                                 
18 In model [6], for EU: exp(0.647) = 1.910;  in model [7], for EFTA: exp(0.682) = 1.978. 
19 In model [8], for EU: exp(0.309) = 1.362;  in model [9] for EFTA: exp(0.083) = 1.087 
20 In model [6], for the nonEUÖEU estimate: exp(-0.332) = 0.717; 
in model [7], for the nonEFTAÖEFTA estimate: exp(-0.206) = 0.814 
21 In model [8], for the nonEUÖEU estimate: exp(-0.133) = 0.875   - 18 -
because its fixed effects manage to capture the elements of a special 
relationship among two countries. For example, it can be argued that German-
Dutch trade relations are different from trade relations that either country 
maintains with any other nation. Pair-specific effects will control for this 
special relationship while country-specific effects fail to do so. 
  The model using country-specific effects can be considered as “a special 
case of the [pair-specific effects] model in that it has a unique value for each 
trading pair’s intercept, with the restrictions that a country’s fixed effect as an 
exporter is the same for all its trading partners” (Cheng and Wall, 2005, p. 51). 
In other words, the country-specific model is a restricted model of pair-specific 
effects. We can easily find out whether the restricted country-specific model 
differs significantly from the unrestricted pair-specific model with a likelihood 
ratio test. The calculated likelihood ratio strongly rejects the null hypothesis, 
which is that the restrictions do not have a statistically significant effect on the 
estimation;
22 we conclude that pair-specific are preferred to country specific 
fixed effects. 
  This conclusion also explains the higher magnitude of the country-
specific coefficient estimates compared to the pair-specific ones. When 
country-specific effects are used, we omit explanatory variables that are most 
probably correlated with other explanatory variables present in our regression. 
As a result, the estimates are biased and the effect of the EU and EFTA may be 
overestimated because their coefficients also capture unobserved factors that 
are specific to country pairs. 
  In light of the previous analysis, our preferred models are equations [8] 
and [9], both of which take account of pair-specific effects. As seen above, the 
estimates of these models provide evidence for our hypothesis that the EU 
caused considerably higher trade diversion than EFTA. While the NonEUÖEU 
coefficient is negative and significant, the NonEFTAÖEFTA coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. One should note that this conclusion is only 
valid on average over the whole period from 1962 to 2004. However, the 
degree of trade diversion was probably far from constant and may have 
evolved. Indeed, for domino effects to take place, trade diversion does not have 
to be present over the entire time period. In the EU context, it would be 
sufficient if trade diversion were particularly strong and/or increasing in the 
years before one or several countries join the EU. Therefore, we change our 
specification slightly to estimate how the four EU and EFTA dummies evolved 
over time.  
                                                 
22 Likelihood ratio test for model [6] nested in model [8]: 
( ) 7 . 29111 ˆ ln ˆ ln 2 = − − = ed unrestrict restricted L L LR  and  ( ) 000 . 0 ) 506 ( 7 . 29111 Pr
2 = > χ  Æ reject H0   - 19 -
b)  Evolution over Time 
 
  This can easily be implemented by interacting the EU and EFTA 
variables with year dummies to get 43 EUÙEU dummies (one for each year 
between 1962 and 2004), 43 EFTAÙEFTA dummies, 43 NonEUÖEU 
dummies, and 43 NonEFTAÖEFTA dummies. To get a better idea of the 
results of this regression, the estimates of β5 and β6 in equations [8] and [9] are 
shown graphically in Figures 1 to 4.
23 
  As expected, the EUÙEU coefficient estimate is significantly positive 
for most of the period from 1962 to 2004 (Figure 1). There are some years 
where it experiences sudden drops, most of which can be explained by 
expansion of membership. The 1973 drop, for instance, is due to the accession 
of the UK, Ireland and Denmark. The accession treaty of these three countries 
provided for a 4-year phase-in period to adopt the customs union (Mongelli, 
Dorrucci and Agur, 2005). Similar explanations can be given for the drops in 
1986 (Spain and Portugal join) and in 1995 (Austria, Sweden and Finland join). 
  The evolution of the EFTAÙEFTA coefficient is quite different 
(Figure 2). It is significantly positive between 1969 and 1977 and significantly 
negative as of 1999. It is consistently lower than the EUÙEU coefficient, most 
of the time significantly so (with the exception of the 1970s). Its trend is rising 
 
































                                                 
23 For the underlying regression results, see Appendix D.   - 20 -


































until 1970 remaining at a relatively high level until 1973 when two EFTAns 
(the UK and Denmark) leave to join the EU. From 1974 to 2004 the trend is 
decreasing and for much of this period the EFTA has no significant impact on 
OECD trade flows. 
  For our assessment of the domino theory, the most interesting variable is 
the NonEUÖEU dummy (Figure 3). The evolution of its coefficient tells an 
interesting story. In most years, it is significantly negative indicating 
considerable trade diversion. In 1980, it starts declining and this trend persists 
until the end of the 1990s. Moreover, trade diversion seems to become a bigger 
issue in 1986 when the Single Market Act is signed and the coefficient is even 
more negative and highly significant as of 1993 when the Maastricht treaty 
comes into effect. Hence, starting toward the end of the 1980s, the EU created 
significant trade diversion for non-members. This may have been a major 
motivation leading EFTA members to either apply for full membership in the 
EU (Austria, Sweden and Finland) or to negotiate a separate trade agreement to 
mitigate the effects of trade diversion (Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and 
Iceland). Trade diversion was also increasing and significant from 1967 to 
1972 in the run-up to the accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark (1973). 
Prior to Spain’s and Portugal’s joining (1986), on the other hand, trade 
diversion was not significant.  
  In sum, trade diversion seems to have been present during the two most 
important EU expansions in the early 1970s and 1990s.   - 21 -































































  With regards to Figure 4, EFTA did not create any trade diversion as 
indicated by a NonEFTAÖEFTA coefficient that is insignificant throughout 
almost the entire period. The estimates detect some significant trade diversion 
as of 2001. One possible explanation is that, by then, EFTA is a small group of 
small countries that are linked to the EU by various agreements such as the 
European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) or a series of   - 22 -
bilateral agreements (Switzerland). As a consequence, EFTA members are 
economically more integrated into the EU bloc than other non-EU countries, 
which may have the effect that EFTA also creates some trade diversion. 
  How do our fixed effects results compare to Sapir (2001), who runs 
separate OLS regressions for each year? Using the original six EU members as 
a control group, Sapir’s EFTA coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero until 1988. As of 1973, this coefficient steadily declines until 1992 when 
his sample period ends. Our findings are roughly similar with the decline of the 
EFTAÙEFTA coefficient continuing until 2004. Sapir also includes an EC-
EFTA dummy variable, which differs from our trade diversion dummies 
(NonEUÖEU  and  NonEFTAÖEFTA). The EC-EFTA dummy does not 
differentiate whether trade flows are from the EFTA to the EC or the reverse 
and, therefore, nothing can be said about trade diversion. Sapir takes the fact 
that both the EFTA and EC-EFTA coefficient become significantly negative at 
the end of the 1980s as supporting evidence for domino effects. 
  Our results point in the same direction: As of 1973, EFTA’s ability to 
influence OECD trade flows decreases steadily while, at the same time, trade 
diversion caused by the EU bloc increases. These results clearly indicate that 
there was a great potential for domino effects in the early 1970s and especially 
as of the late 1980s. However, we cannot yet conclude that trade diversion (and 
thus domino effects) have played a major role, without controlling for other 
factors that may have had an impact on countries’ decision whether or not to 
join the EU. This issue will be analysed in the following section.   - 23 -
4.  The Importance of Domino Effects in Europe 
 
  Our gravity analysis has revealed that the expansion and deepening of the 
EU had a negative impact on non-members by causing trade diversion. This is 
a necessary condition for domino effects, but it is not sufficient. Remember, 
the domino theory essentially states that the conclusion of a new RTA or the 
deepening of an existing one will induce non-members to join. Therefore, to 
make our empirical analysis complete, we need to assess the impact of domino 
variables on the probability that a particular country applies for EU 
membership. The most obvious way to do this is with a discrete choice model. 
 
4.1  Conceptual and Methodological Framework 
 
a)  The Determinants of RTAs 
 
  Until recently, research interest in regionalism focused on the economic 
effects of RTAs on trade flows and the RTA dummy was treated as exogenous. 
Perhaps as a consequence of the post Cold War upsurge in RTAs, the question 
of which factors actually cause regionalism has made its appearance on the 
research agenda. The domino theory (Baldwin, 1993) was one of the first to 
suggest an explanation for why countries choose to join an RTA. Baldwin 
gives a political reason with economic roots: pro-membership lobbying efforts 
increase because domestic companies lose competitiveness in comparison to 
members of an RTA.  
  In the past three years, a few empirical studies were done on the 
determinants of RTAs. However, none of these takes a closer look at domino 
effects. The first attempt that systematically looks at factors influencing the 
probability of two countries forming an RTA is Baier and Bergstrand (2003). 
They find that the likelihood of an RTA between a country pair is higher the 
smaller the distance between them and the farther away they are from the rest 
of the world. In addition, higher potential gains due to different capital-labour 
ratios (Heckscher-Ohlin trade) have a positive impact on RTA formation. 
  Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) offer a more political explanation for 
RTA formation, arguing that one of the main determinants of regional trade 
agreements are developments at the multilateral level. In their view, difficulties 
in GATT/WTO negotiations prompt countries to engage in regionalism. In 
another study, Wu (2004) shows that democracy and economic freedom have a 
significant impact and she also finds a positive relationship between trade   - 24 -
uncertainty and RTA formation. She argues that globalisation has engendered 
greater trade uncertainty, which leads countries to conclude RTAs in an 
attempt to alleviate potential risks in a highly integrated global economy. 
  After determining which of the 158 RTAs are effectively implemented, 
Holmes (2005) analyses a variety of potential factors influencing RTA 
formation. Convincing evidence is found that mercantile interests in assuring 
export market access are a key explanation. This is in line with the idea that 
RTAs are more likely between countries trading already to a considerable 
extent with each other. 
  Our analysis examines the impact of domino variables on the decision of 
joining or not joining the EU. In other words we try to establish that the size of 
the EU bloc and its degree of integration have a significant effect on the 
likelihood of accession. We control for a variety of other potentially significant 
determinants that were briefly presented above. 
 
b)  Unconditional vs. Conditional Fixed Effects Logit 
 
  In essence, we want to determine which factors are important in a 
country’s decision regarding EU membership. Therefore, our dependent 
variable is binary. The models most readily used in such contexts are probit 
and logit. The difference between probit and logit models is in the assumption 
about the functional form of the cumulative probability distribution function 
(cdf). Probit assumes a normal cdf, while logit assumes a logistic cdf. There is 
no clear theoretical guidance on which functional form to opt for and in most 
cases, the choice between the two does not make much difference (Greene, 
2003, chap. 21). We select the logit model for a practical reason: in a panel 
data context, logit offers ways to alleviate the incidental parameters problem 
(described below). 
  We use the following fixed effects logit model: 
  ) ' (
) ' exp( 1
) ' exp(
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  In our domino context, yit denotes the observation on EU membership 
(1 = member;  0 = not  member)  for  country  i  at time t;  x’it β represents the 
explanatory variables and the corresponding coefficients; αi are the country-
specific fixed effects (also called incidental parameters).  
  When this fixed-effects model is estimated by maximising the 
unconditional likelihood function, the estimator of the country-specific effects   - 25 -
αi is consistent as T ö ¶ for fixed N, but inconsistent as N ö ¶ for fixed T. 
This is the incidental parameters problem, which, according to Katz (2001), 
arises because the number of country-specific parameters increases with N, 
while the amount of information about each of these country-specific (or 
incidental) parameters is fixed. This problem has potentially far-reaching 
repercussions because the estimator of β  is a function of the α-estimators, 
which means that all other coefficient estimates are not consistent either. Also, 
when T is small, estimators will be biased. Yet, there is no consensus among 
econometricians as to the size of this bias.
24 
  In contrast to the unconditional likelihood function, the conditional 
likelihood function does not include the incidental parameters αi. As a 
consequence, using the conditional logit estimation method provides 
coefficient estimates that are consistent even in a panel data context. We thus 
prefer conditional to unconditional fixed effects logit estimates. 
 
4.2  Data and Specifications 
 
a) Data  Issues 
 
  Like in the previous sections, our analysis covers the period from 1962 to 
2004 for the same 25 OECD countries. Our dependent variable is a binary 
variable indicating whether a particular country i was an EU member at time t 
(Pr(EUit= 1)). This dummy is regressed on a number of explanatory variables 
using the following logit model. 
 Pr(EUit = 1) = Λ (αi  + β1Size of EU blocit  
   +  β2Degree of EU integrationt 
    +   β3Trade uncertaintyit  
    +   β4Multilateral backlasht + εit) [11] 
  The above specification contains two variables that find their raison 
d’être in the domino theory. The Size of EU bloc coefficient captures the effect 
of changes in the economic size of the EU. The bigger the EU, the higher the 
loss in competitiveness for outsiders and, thus, the higher the probability that a 
country will join the EU. The impact of Size of EU bloc is different for each 
country as indicated by the it subscript. It depends on the importance the EU 
                                                 
24 Katz (2001) finds only a negligible amount of bias for T ¥16. Greene (2003), on the other 
hand, cites older studies that estimate the bias to be more substantive.   - 26 -
has for a particular country. This is measured by the percentage of exports that 
country i sends to EU members at time t, which is calculated using annual 
export data from the UN Comtrade database. Including the variable Percentage 
of exports to EU members may bring about a simultaneity problem. We already 
alluded to this issue in the gravity part of this paper and it is perennial topic of 
discussion among economists analysing RTAs. One would reasonably expect 
that the level of a particular country’s exports to the EU not only has an impact 
on the probability of accession, but also the reverse: the fact that a country 
joins the EU bloc should usually boost the share of exports that are sent to 
other EU members.
25 Instrumental variable techniques are a possible solution. 
However, it is not obvious which instrument might be a valid candidate to 
address the simultaneity problem. In addition, applying instrumental variable 
techniques in a (conditional) fixed effects logit context seems rather 
complicated and I doubt that any econometric computer programme would 
provide an easy solution.
26 
  The domino theory also states that the probability of EU accession may 
increase as institutional integration is deepened. The rationale behind this 
assertion is that higher integration will most likely increase the degree of trade 
diversion. This effect is reflected in the Degree of EU integration variable, the 
coefficient of which is expected to be positive. Mongelli, Dorrucci, and Agur 
(2005) have developed an index for each EU member showing how well it 
participated in different EU institutions at a certain point in time. In our 
analysis, an aggregate of these indices is calculated to measure the degree of 
EU integration. 
  Trade uncertainty is used as a control variable. Its roots are in Wu (2004), 
which finds significant positive effects on the likelihood that a particular 
country concludes RTAs. Like in her study, we will use trade openness as a 
proxy for trade uncertainty. Our measure for trade openness comes from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) database, which takes tariffs measured 
by import duties as a percentage of total imports. We expect that the more open 
country i is at time t, the higher the probability of joining the EU. 
  A second control variable (Multilateral backlash) comes from Mansfield 
and Reinhardt (2003). They argue that when multilateral relations in the WTO 
become more complicated and less manageable, countries have an incentive to 
liberalise in a regional or bilateral manner. In other words, the probability of 
RTAs increases in proportion to difficulties in WTO negotiations, which of 
course are difficult to quantify. We will proxy multilateral backlash by the 
number of WTO members, reflecting the fact that it is frequently claimed that 
                                                 
25 This is what we tested with the gravity model in section 3. 
26 STATA, for instance, does not offer such a possibility for its clogit command.   - 27 -
as the number of WTO countries increases, multilateral trade negotiations 
become harder. Since trade talks at the WTO usually take place during rounds, 
the number of WTO members is interacted with a dummy variable, which 
equals one if, in a particular year, a trade round is underway.
27 
 
b) Logit  Specifications 
 
  In light of the previous sub-section, equation [11] is adapted as follows. 
 Pr(EUit = 1) = Λ (αi  + β1Percentage of exports to EU membersit  
   +  β2Index of EU integrationt 
    +   β3Trade opennessit  
    +   β4WTO membership · trade round yest + εit) [12] 
  Equation [12] is estimated using different logit panel data techniques: 
pooled logit, unconditional logit with country-specific fixed effects and 
conditional logit with country-specific fixed effects. Each of these techniques 
is applied for two distinct specifications which differ in whether or not the 
control variables (Trade openness and WTO membership · trade round yes) are 
included. This allows for testing the joint significance of the controls. 
  The first two models are simple pooled logits, neglecting cross-country 
heterogeneity. Model I includes the control variables, model II does not. The 
estimates of these two models are expected to be biased due to the omitted 
variables problem. We think that there are (partly unobservable) country 
characteristics, such as historical, cultural and political factors, that have an 
impact on the probability of joining the EU. In addition, some of the 
unobservable country characteristics are likely to be correlated with the 
included explanatory variables. 
  To mitigate the heterogeneity bias, we adopt the same strategy as in our 
gravity estimations: we use panel data techniques and specifically fixed 
effects.
28 Models III and IV apply unconditional logit controlling for country-
specific fixed effects. As a result, we lose all observations for those countries 
which were either in the EU during the entire period or non-EU members until 
2004. Since the country-specific fixed effects absorb all time-constant country 
characteristics, only those countries which had a change in EU membership 
will remain in the sample. In the same intent, models V and VI estimate a 
                                                 
27 For more information on data, as well as line charts describing it, see Appendix E. 
28 A random-effects model is, again, not a valid solution because it provides biased estimates. 
The reasons for this are essentially the same as those presented in section 3.2(c).   - 28 -
conditional fixed effects logit to prevent, at the same time, the incidental 
parameters problem discussed in section 4.1(b). A positive side effect of 
country-specific fixed effects is that they also control for time-constant factors 
explicitly included in previous studies such as Baier and Bergstrand (2003), 




  The results of the six models are shown in Table 2. As for pooled logit 
estimates (models I and II), the domino variables coefficients have the 
expected signs. However, only the coefficient of the variable reflecting the size 
of the EU bloc (Percentage of exports to EU members) is significant. The 
coefficients of the control variables are insignificant at any reasonable 
confidence level. In contrast to standard OLS, the magnitude of the coefficients 
is not that easy to interpret because of the non-linear nature of the logistic 
function.
29 For our purposes, it suffices to know the sign of the coefficients and 
whether they are significant. As a note of caution, we have to keep in mind that 
the pooled estimates (I and II) are probably gravely biased, a hypothesis which 
will be tested further below. 
  The results of the unconditional fixed effects logit seem much more 
reasonable. Model III provides estimates, which are positively significant for 
our first domino variable (Percentage of exports to EU members) and for Wu’s 
(2004) trade uncertainty proxy (Trade openness). The regression without 
control variables (model IV) shows that both domino factors have a significant 
impact on the probability of EU accession. Unsurprisingly, thanks to the 
country-specific fixed effects, the goodness of fit has increased. Although the 
unconditional fixed effects take care of the heterogeneity bias, we should treat 
these results with some caution because of the incidental parameters problem. 
  Columns V and VI of Table 2 display the results of the conditional fixed 
effects logit model. A comparison of model V with III shows that the Trade 
openness coefficient loses its significance once the incidental parameters 
problem is under control. The only significantly positive coefficient in model V 
is Percentage of exports to EU members (at 5%-level). If the control variables 
are dropped (model VI), both domino variables are significantly positive. With 
respect to goodness of fit, it is basically as good as before. The reader may 
wonder why the percentage of correctly predicted outcomes is not reported. 
The reason is that, since the country-specific effects are not actually estimated  
 
                                                 
29 A rule of thumb is to divide the logit estimates by 4 to make them comparable to a linear 
model (Wooldridge, 2002, chap. 15)   - 29 -
Table 2: Logit Regressions of EU Membership 
    (Criterion: Date of Entry into Force of Accession Treaty) 
Dependent Variable 
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Number  of  observations  1010  1010  413 413  373 373 
McFadden’s Pseudo R
2  0.3853 0.3845  0.9770 0.9660  0.9799 0.9671 
% correctly predicted  78.6 %  78.9 %  99.3 %  99.3 %  n/a  n/a 
Log-likelihood value  -410.182 -410.687  -6.489  -9.585  -4.080  -6.680 
Akaike Criterion (AIC)  830.363  827.375  36.979  39.169  16.160  17.360 
Schwarz  Criterion  (BIC) 854.952  842.128  85.260 79.404  31.846 25.203 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets. 
 
in the conditional logit model, it is not possible to compute probabilities with 
these coefficient estimates (Greene, 2003). 
  Regarding the coefficients of our control variables, they are hardly ever 
significant in any of the models (an exception is the Trade openness coefficient 
in model III). In addition, these control variables do not seem to make a big 
difference when considering the specification without the controls as a 
restricted case of the general model. The similar log-likelihood values for the 
restricted and unrestricted model in all three cases hint at such a conclusion. 
We formally check this with a likelihood ratio test. Using a 5% significance   - 30 -
level, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the restrictions do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the estimation for the pooled model and for the 
conditional fixed effects model. In other words, it does not make a significant 
difference whether the control variables are included in the pooled and 
conditional logit specification. As for the unconditional logit, the likelihood 
ratio indicates that the controls are jointly significant.
30 
  The incidental parameters problem was brought up on several occasions 
in the previous paragraphs with a warning that both pooled logit and 
unobserved fixed effects logit models are inconsistent if there is unobserved 
heterogeneity among countries. Should this be the case, we can estimate a 
conditional fixed effects logit model. However, in the absence of cross-country 
heterogeneity, there is no inconsistency problem, but we would prefer the 
pooled logit estimates because of their higher efficiency. Since the pooled logit 
likelihood ratios are not comparable with the conditional fixed effects logit 
ones, the most natural way to test for consistency of the pooled model is to 
perform a Hausman test (Greene, 2003). Under the null hypothesis both 
estimators are consistent, but the conditional logit estimator is inefficient. 
Under the alternative hypothesis, the pooled logit estimator is inconsistent, 
while the conditional logit estimator is consistent. The Hausman statistic 
rejects the null at a 5%-level and we deduce that only estimation using 
conditional fixed effect logit is consistent.
31 Hence, our preferred models are 
models V and VI. 
  In all models estimated so far, our dependent variable is a binary variable 
indicating whether country i  was an EU member at time t. This dummy 
changes from 0 to 1 in the year when the accession treaty enters into force. One 
may argue that the decision to join the EU takes place well before the entry 
into force of the accession treaty. As a result, the EU dummy should switch 
from 0 to 1 in the year when a particular country applies for EU membership. 
This dependent variable, however, poses some problems because some 
countries applied for EU membership but failed to join for various reasons.
32 
An alternative criterion to determine the EU dummy is the year when the 
accession treaty is signed.
33 We followed this approach to construct a second  
 
                                                 
30 Pooled logit (I vs. II): LR = 1.01 and Pr(1.01 > c
2[2]) = 0.603 Æ do not reject H0  
Unconditional logit (III vs. IV): LR = 6.19 and Pr(6.19 > c
2[2]) = 0.045 Æ reject H0 
Conditional logit (V vs. VI): LR = 5.20 and Pr(5.20 > c
2[2]) = 0.074 Æ do not reject H0 
31 Model VI (consistent under H0 & H1) vs. model II (inconsistent under H1, efficient under H0) 
Hausman = 7.88 and Pr(7.88 > c
2[2]) = 0.019 Æ reject H0 
32 The most prominent example is Switzerland, which formally applied for EU membership in 
the early 1990s. Several negative referenda demonstrated the lack of popular support and 
today, Switzerland is still not in the EU. 
33 For a list of countries and the dates when the respective accession treaties were signed, see 
Appendix E.   - 31 -
Table 3: Conditional Logit Regressions (country-specific fixed effects) 
Dependent Variable 
Pr(EUit = 1) 
Criterion: 
Date of Entry into Force 
Criterion: 
Date of Signature 
Independent Variables  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Percentage of exports 













































Number  of  observations  373 373  373 373 
McFadden’s Pseudo R
2  0.9799 0.9671  0.9565 0.9671 
% correctly predicted  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Log-likelihood value  -4.080  -6.680  -8.863  -12.189 
Akaike Criterion (AIC)  16.160  17.360  25.726  28.379 
Schwarz  Criterion  (BIC)  31.846 25.203  41.412 36.222 
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets. 
 
data set. The results of logit regressions using this data set are presented in 
Table 3. Our analysis in the previous paragraphs has shown that the conditional 
logit models are preferred (models V and VI). The results of these are 
reproduced in the first two columns of Table 3 for convenience. The last two 
columns present the results of the conditional logit regressions using the data 
set based on the date when the accession treaty was signed (models VII and 
VIII). 
  Similar to the results using the Entry into Force criterion, the estimates in 
models VII and VIII have the expected sign. Both domino variables 
(Percentage of exports to EU and Index of EU integration) are now highly 
significant as indicated by p-values close to zero. The Trade openness 
coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level but the variable capturing 
difficulties in multilateral trade negotiations remains insignificant at any 
reasonable confidence level. All four models have a high explanatory power. A   - 32 -
likelihood ratio test reveals that when using the data set based on the Signature 
criterion, the model including the control variables (model VII) is better.
34 
  Which of the two criteria is preferred? In my opinion, one can find 
arguments for both. Independent of whether one uses the Entry into Force or 
the Signature criterion, variables related to the domino theory seem to play an 
important role in a country’s accession decision. The coefficient estimate of 
Percentage of exports to EU is significantly positive in all models. The other 
domino variable, Index of EU integration, is significant when using the data set 
based on the date when the accession treaty was signed. The reason for this 
ambiguity is that the degree of institutional integration may affect the 
probability of joining the EU both positively and negatively. Positively because 
of the domino theory, negatively because deep integration means that a future 
EU country will have to delegate many political and economic responsibilities 
to Brussels. Most countries dislike any loss of sovereignty. 
  Among the two explicitly included control variables, only the variable 
capturing the uncertainty in international trade relations (Trade openness) is 
marginally significant in some specifications. Difficulties in the WTO do not 
appear to have any impact on whether or not a country joins the EU, which 
contradicts the findings in Mansfield and Reinhardt (2001). 
                                                 
34 Model VII vs. model VIII: LR = 6.65 and Pr(6.65 > c
2[2]) = 0.036 Æ reject H0   - 33 -
5. Conclusions 
 
  The primary purpose of this paper was to address the question whether 
domino effects constitute a reasonable explanation for the expansion in EU 
membership over the past forty years. While previous studies have sought 
empirical evidence on the topic, this paper is the first to use sophisticated 
econometric tools to subject Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory to thorough 
scrutiny. Moreover, it is not limited to a simple estimation of the degree of 
trade diversion but also investigates the extent to which variables from the 
domino theory affect the likelihood that a country applies for EU membership. 
  In a first stage, bilateral trade flows between OECD countries were 
examined using a gravity model. Our results suggest that throughout the 
sample period (1962-2004), the EU exerted a strong impact on trade patterns 
among industrial countries, both through trade creation and trade diversion. 
Intra-EU trade flows were, on average throughout the period, over 35% higher 
than non-preferential flows. With regards to trade diversion, exports from non-
EU countries to EU members were over 10% smaller than exports to countries 
that are not in the EU. We also looked at the evolution over time and detected 
an increasing degree of trade diversion from 1967-1972 and from 1980 until 
today. This exercise showed that during most of the sample period, trade 
diversion caused by the EU was significant, possibly constituting an important 
impetus for domino effects. 
  As the first part of the paper had established that the economic effects of 
the EU on non-members were considerable, the analysis went on to determine 
the factors that increase the probability of EU accession. We found that the 
relative importance of the EU bloc for a particular country has a significant 
impact on the accession decision. This supports the domino theory in that it 
confirms that as the size of an RTA increases, non-members are more likely to 
join. The effect of the degree of institutional integration in the EU is more 
ambiguous, which arguably reflects political anxieties. Two control variables, 
namely trade uncertainty and difficulties in multilateral trade negotiations at 
the WTO are unlikely to be important in a country’s accession decision. 
  In essence, this paper has shown that the domino theory performs well in 
an empirical exercise. While we managed to control for a variety of omitted 
variables that caused trouble in some previous studies, a few issues still remain 
unresolved, most notably the reverse causality (or simultaneity) problem. The 
only feasible way to eliminate the resulting bias is an instrumental variables 
approach. Unfortunately, finding a proper instrument for the EU dummy is far  
   - 34 -
from easy, and it comes to nobody’s surprise that the notorious “needle in the 
haystack” has not yet been found. In the meantime, one should exercise caution 
when interpreting our results and keep in mind the possible simultaneity bias. 
  In the future, this study could serve as a model for empirical analyses of 
domino effects in other parts of the world, such as America and Asia. Once its 
specifications have been refined further, economists may not only explain why 
countries joined a particular RTA, they could conceivably also predict which 
nation will be the next falling domino.   - 35 -
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7.   Appendix 
 
A.  Data (analysed in section 3) 
 
a)  List of Countries and Membership in EU/EFTA 
 
Country EU  EFTA  none 
Australia        1962-2004 
Austria  1995-2004 1962-1994    
Belgium  1962-2004       
Canada        1962-2004 
Germany  1962-2004       
Denmark  1973-2004 1962-1972    
Spain 1986-2004      1962-1985 
Finland  1995-2004 1962-1994    
France  1962-2004       
Greece 1981-2004      1962-1980 
Ireland 1973-2004    1962-1972 
Iceland     1970-2004  1962-1969 
Italy  1962-2004       
Japan        1962-2004 
Korea        1962-2004 
Luxembourg  1962-2004       
Mexico        1962-2004 
Netherlands  1962-2004       
Norway     1962-2004    
New Zealand        1962-2004 
Portugal  1986-2004 1962-1985    
Sweden  1995-2004 1962-1994    
Switzerland     1962-2004    
Turkey        1962-2004 
United  Kingdom  1973-2004 1962-1972    
United States        1962-2004 
 
 
b) Data  Sources 
 
Bilateral imports (nominal)  UN Comtrade database  





World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) database 
(devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/) 
 
Total population  WDI (see above) 
 
Date range  1962-2004 








Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (H0: homoskedasticity): 
BP = 3540.28 and Pr(3540.28 > c
2[1]) = 0.000 Æ reject H0 
 
 




Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (H0: homoskedasticity): 
BP = 11825.07 and Pr(11825.07 > c
2[1]) = 0.000 Æ reject H0   - 40 -













































Number of observations  12 245  12 245 
R
2 0.8795  0.9726 
Adjusted R
2 0.8788  0.9718 
Root MSE  0.8994  0.4341 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets. 
 
 
Note that when using averaged trade flows, it is completely arbitrary which 
country is the origin and which the destination. For this reason, we take the log 
of the product of both GDPs (or population) to get only one estimate for the 
GDP (population) coefficient.   - 41 -
D.  Results of Regressions with Time-Interacted RTA Dummies 
 
 
a)   Equation [8] with Time-Interacted EU Dummies 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =   22957 
                                                       F(132, 22272) = 1247.30 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9600 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9587 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .53646 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    limports |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp_o |   1.436149   .0283284    50.70   0.000     1.380623    1.491675 
      lgdp_d |   1.074097   .0293805    36.56   0.000     1.016509    1.131685 
      lpop_o |   .8284262   .0882303     9.39   0.000     .6554885    1.001364 
      lpop_d |   1.413624   .1042743    13.56   0.000      1.20924    1.618009 
        eu62 |  -.0260311   .1138669    -0.23   0.819    -.2492183    .1971561 
        eu63 |   .2709173    .158336     1.71   0.087    -.0394325    .5812671 
        eu64 |   .2766397   .1632753     1.69   0.090    -.0433914    .5966709 
        eu65 |   .2786709   .1733693     1.61   0.108    -.0611452    .6184869 
        eu66 |   .3224449   .1622854     1.99   0.047      .004354    .6405357 
        eu67 |   .3173409   .1500167     2.12   0.034     .0232976    .6113841 
        eu68 |   .3001333   .1442514     2.08   0.037     .0173904    .5828763 
        eu69 |   .2286197   .0667879     3.42   0.001     .0977107    .3595286 
        eu70 |   .1736313   .0603326     2.88   0.004     .0553751    .2918875 
        eu71 |   .2175317   .0445594     4.88   0.000      .130192    .3048713 
        eu72 |    .234959    .041995     5.59   0.000     .1526458    .3172723 
        eu73 |   .0052671   .0493354     0.11   0.915    -.0914338    .1019679 
        eu74 |   .0657565   .0525508     1.25   0.211    -.0372468    .1687597 
        eu75 |   .1190043   .0462811     2.57   0.010     .0282901    .2097184 
        eu76 |   .3360351   .0428081     7.85   0.000     .2521282    .4199419 
        eu77 |   .3182354   .0467937     6.80   0.000     .2265165    .4099543 
        eu78 |   .3108765   .0500234     6.21   0.000     .2128272    .4089259 
        eu79 |   .2301807   .0433895     5.30   0.000     .1451342    .3152272 
        eu80 |   .1996012   .0395665     5.04   0.000      .122048    .2771544 
        eu81 |   .3102162   .0363445     8.54   0.000     .2389784    .3814541 
        eu82 |   .3597291   .0354954    10.13   0.000     .2901556    .4293027 
        eu83 |   .4119852   .0383386    10.75   0.000     .3368388    .4871316 
        eu84 |    .449558   .0374322    12.01   0.000     .3761882    .5229278 
        eu85 |   .4475553    .038105    11.75   0.000     .3728669    .5222438 
        eu86 |   .2688983   .0346062     7.77   0.000     .2010677    .3367289 
        eu87 |   .2921704   .0372716     7.84   0.000     .2191155    .3652254 
        eu88 |   .3633401   .0374118     9.71   0.000     .2900103    .4366698 
        eu89 |     .45779   .0394014    11.62   0.000     .3805605    .5350195 
        eu90 |   .3809318   .0389146     9.79   0.000     .3046564    .4572071 
        eu91 |   .3892403   .0361679    10.76   0.000     .3183486    .4601319 
        eu92 |   .3253779   .0394033     8.26   0.000     .2481447    .4026111 
        eu93 |   .3140728   .0403582     7.78   0.000     .2349678    .3931778 
        eu94 |   .3088928   .0428237     7.21   0.000     .2249553    .3928304 
        eu95 |   .1870361   .0468753     3.99   0.000     .0951571     .278915 
        eu96 |   .2045656    .044962     4.55   0.000     .1164369    .2926942 
        eu97 |   .2597774   .0439004     5.92   0.000     .1737295    .3458253 
        eu98 |   .2080543   .0448215     4.64   0.000     .1202009    .2959077 
        eu99 |   .2833621   .0455002     6.23   0.000     .1941785    .3725458 
        eu00 |   .4119493   .0484016     8.51   0.000     .3170787    .5068199 
        eu01 |   .3801404    .048277     7.87   0.000      .285514    .4747668 
        eu02 |   .3845748   .0504474     7.62   0.000     .2856944    .4834552 
        eu03 |   .3059692   .0498596     6.14   0.000     .2082409    .4036975 
        eu04 |   .2782422   .0532735     5.22   0.000     .1738223    .3826621 
   eu_noeu62 |  -.1706811   .1136403    -1.50   0.133    -.3934241    .0520618 
   eu_noeu63 |   .0449825    .105077     0.43   0.669    -.1609758    .2509408 
   eu_noeu64 |   .0863126   .0889574     0.97   0.332    -.0880501    .2606753 
   eu_noeu65 |   .0686346   .0824768     0.83   0.405    -.0930256    .2302949 
   eu_noeu66 |   .0623399   .0796549     0.78   0.434    -.0937893    .2184691 
   eu_noeu67 |  -.0044169   .0751366    -0.06   0.953      -.15169    .1428562 
   eu_noeu68 |  -.0993577   .0698232    -1.42   0.155     -.236216    .0375007 
   eu_noeu69 |  -.2274075   .0576468    -3.94   0.000    -.3403994   -.1144156 
   eu_noeu70 |    -.30861   .0575252    -5.36   0.000    -.4213634   -.1958566 
   eu_noeu71 |  -.3596935   .0515638    -6.98   0.000    -.4607621   -.2586249 
   eu_noeu72 |  -.3281896   .0458044    -7.17   0.000    -.4179695   -.2384098 
   eu_noeu73 |  -.1613648   .0490224    -3.29   0.001    -.2574522   -.0652774 
   eu_noeu74 |  -.2018928   .0503831    -4.01   0.000    -.3006473   -.1031384 
   eu_noeu75 |  -.1866833   .0540994    -3.45   0.001    -.2927218   -.0806447   - 42 -
   eu_noeu76 |  -.0293863   .0488918    -0.60   0.548    -.1252178    .0664451 
   eu_noeu77 |  -.0175684    .045292    -0.39   0.698    -.1063438    .0712071 
   eu_noeu78 |  -.0064988    .049192    -0.13   0.895    -.1029186    .0899211 
   eu_noeu79 |  -.0308692   .0488005    -0.63   0.527    -.1265217    .0647832 
   eu_noeu80 |   -.016879   .0493594    -0.34   0.732     -.113627     .079869 
   eu_noeu81 |  -.1272876    .051747    -2.46   0.014    -.2287154   -.0258598 
   eu_noeu82 |  -.1062894   .0518958    -2.05   0.041    -.2080087     -.00457 
   eu_noeu83 |  -.0691354   .0531022    -1.30   0.193    -.1732194    .0349487 
   eu_noeu84 |   -.087274   .0507903    -1.72   0.086    -.1868264    .0122785 
   eu_noeu85 |  -.1088395   .0496609    -2.19   0.028    -.2061784   -.0115007 
   eu_noeu86 |   -.153331   .0437717    -3.50   0.000    -.2391266   -.0675354 
   eu_noeu87 |  -.0976566   .0511896    -1.91   0.056    -.1979918    .0026787 
   eu_noeu88 |  -.1073067   .0470502    -2.28   0.023    -.1995284    -.015085 
   eu_noeu89 |  -.1007434   .0452676    -2.23   0.026     -.189471   -.0120158 
   eu_noeu90 |  -.0812493   .0455599    -1.78   0.075      -.17055    .0080513 
   eu_noeu91 |  -.0821759   .0432407    -1.90   0.057    -.1669307    .0025789 
   eu_noeu92 |  -.0932432    .045077    -2.07   0.039    -.1815973   -.0048891 
   eu_noeu93 |  -.1383098   .0489117    -2.83   0.005    -.2341801   -.0424395 
   eu_noeu94 |  -.2256639   .0527616    -4.28   0.000    -.3290803   -.1222475 
   eu_noeu95 |  -.2429198   .0629202    -3.86   0.000    -.3662478   -.1195918 
   eu_noeu96 |  -.2742695   .0601409    -4.56   0.000    -.3921498   -.1563891 
   eu_noeu97 |  -.2818376   .0568911    -4.95   0.000    -.3933481    -.170327 
   eu_noeu98 |  -.1775892    .057901    -3.07   0.002    -.2910793   -.0640991 
   eu_noeu99 |  -.2221789   .0581453    -3.82   0.000    -.3361478     -.10821 
   eu_noeu00 |   -.158887   .0627706    -2.53   0.011    -.2819218   -.0358521 
   eu_noeu01 |  -.1803484   .0607209    -2.97   0.003    -.2993658   -.0613311 
   eu_noeu02 |  -.1912912   .0606722    -3.15   0.002     -.310213   -.0723694 
   eu_noeu03 |  -.1888115   .0632246    -2.99   0.003    -.3127363   -.0648868 
   eu_noeu04 |  -.2094143    .069258    -3.02   0.003    -.3451649   -.0736637 
          y2 |   -.190166   .0757438    -2.51   0.012    -.3386292   -.0417027 
          y3 |  -.3615975    .075449    -4.79   0.000    -.5094829   -.2137122 
          y4 |  -.4965297   .0741428    -6.70   0.000    -.6418548   -.3512047 
          y5 |  -.6256006   .0751579    -8.32   0.000    -.7729154   -.4782859 
          y6 |  -.7540166   .0718653   -10.49   0.000    -.8948777   -.6131556 
          y7 |   -.810719   .0688087   -11.78   0.000     -.945589    -.675849 
          y8 |  -.9414405   .0730897   -12.88   0.000    -1.084701   -.7981796 
          y9 |  -1.004682   .0755202   -13.30   0.000    -1.152707    -.856657 
         y10 |  -1.234332   .0750427   -16.45   0.000    -1.381421   -1.087243 
         y11 |  -1.499215   .0766504   -19.56   0.000    -1.649455   -1.348975 
         y12 |  -1.756501   .0828735   -21.19   0.000    -1.918939   -1.594063 
         y13 |  -1.849914   .0886396   -20.87   0.000    -2.023654   -1.676174 
         y14 |  -2.227568   .0914191   -24.37   0.000    -2.406756    -2.04838 
         y15 |  -2.394353    .092233   -25.96   0.000    -2.575136    -2.21357 
         y16 |  -2.552907   .0947354   -26.95   0.000    -2.738595   -2.367219 
         y17 |  -2.900013   .1020496   -28.42   0.000    -3.100037   -2.699988 
         y18 |  -3.034557   .1072109   -28.30   0.000    -3.244698   -2.824416 
         y19 |  -3.218844   .1120683   -28.72   0.000    -3.438506   -2.999183 
         y20 |  -3.151992   .1105303   -28.52   0.000    -3.368639   -2.935344 
         y21 |  -3.147316   .1097028   -28.69   0.000    -3.362341   -2.932291 
         y22 |  -3.129395   .1102384   -28.39   0.000     -3.34547    -2.91332 
         y23 |  -3.039123   .1100758   -27.61   0.000    -3.254879   -2.823366 
         y24 |  -3.048694   .1114249   -27.36   0.000    -3.267095   -2.830293 
         y25 |  -3.451258   .1190156   -29.00   0.000    -3.684537   -3.217979 
         y26 |  -3.749184   .1269657   -29.53   0.000    -3.998046   -3.500322 
         y27 |  -3.971384    .132523   -29.97   0.000    -4.231139    -3.71163 
         y28 |   -4.03379   .1346896   -29.95   0.000    -4.297791   -3.769788 
         y29 |  -4.310701   .1399608   -30.80   0.000    -4.585034   -4.036367 
         y30 |  -4.433046    .140904   -31.46   0.000    -4.709227   -4.156864 
         y31 |  -4.549106   .1427364   -31.87   0.000    -4.828879   -4.269332 
         y32 |  -4.517845   .1417383   -31.87   0.000    -4.795662   -4.240027 
         y33 |  -4.558043   .1449401   -31.45   0.000    -4.842136    -4.27395 
         y34 |  -4.693054   .1518677   -30.90   0.000    -4.990726   -4.395383 
         y35 |  -4.749362   .1531442   -31.01   0.000    -5.049535   -4.449188 
         y36 |  -4.670643   .1521981   -30.69   0.000    -4.968962   -4.372324 
         y37 |  -4.662748   .1511024   -30.86   0.000    -4.958919   -4.366577 
         y38 |   -4.75214   .1536684   -30.92   0.000    -5.053341   -4.450939 
         y39 |  -4.714739   .1545646   -30.50   0.000    -5.017696   -4.411781 
         y40 |  -4.727479   .1542552   -30.65   0.000    -5.029831   -4.425128 
         y41 |  -4.923385   .1579708   -31.17   0.000    -5.233019   -4.613751 
         y42 |  -5.186881   .1641889   -31.59   0.000    -5.508702   -4.865059 
         y43 |  -5.384064   .1701362   -31.65   0.000    -5.717543   -5.050585 
       _cons |  -85.60301   2.519391   -33.98   0.000    -90.54119   -80.66482 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        pair |   absorbed                                     (553 categories) 
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b)   Equation [9] with Time-Interacted EFTA Dummies 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs =   22957 
                                                       F(132, 22272) = 1106.56 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9594 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9582 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .54013 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    limports |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp_o |   1.432962   .0284716    50.33   0.000     1.377156    1.488768 
      lgdp_d |   1.055201   .0294496    35.83   0.000     .9974776    1.112924 
      lpop_o |   .3523922   .0804551     4.38   0.000     .1946945    .5100899 
      lpop_d |   1.056209   .0895204    11.80   0.000     .8807426    1.231675 
      efta62 |  -.2395771   .1178043    -2.03   0.042    -.4704819   -.0086723 
      efta63 |  -.1832159   .0950057    -1.93   0.054    -.3694339     .003002 
      efta64 |  -.1138008   .0863731    -1.32   0.188    -.2830982    .0554965 
      efta65 |   -.041634   .0814595    -0.51   0.609    -.2013003    .1180324 
      efta66 |   .0099142   .0781882     0.13   0.899    -.1433403    .1631686 
      efta67 |   .0240979   .0784974     0.31   0.759    -.1297624    .1779583 
      efta68 |   .0965637   .0719367     1.34   0.179    -.0444373    .2375647 
      efta69 |   .2465614   .0725889     3.40   0.001     .1042819    .3888408 
      efta70 |   .4426822   .0739803     5.98   0.000     .2976756    .5876889 
      efta71 |    .436054    .065142     6.69   0.000      .308371    .5637369 
      efta72 |   .3872727   .0676773     5.72   0.000     .2546204     .519925 
      efta73 |   .4355996   .0706651     6.16   0.000     .2970911    .5741081 
      efta74 |   .3647525   .0657026     5.55   0.000     .2359707    .4935342 
      efta75 |   .3145065   .0731754     4.30   0.000     .1710776    .4579354 
      efta76 |   .1297491   .0563772     2.30   0.021     .0192459    .2402524 
      efta77 |   .0426834   .0497537     0.86   0.391    -.0548374    .1402041 
      efta78 |   .0767242   .0519202     1.48   0.139    -.0250431    .1784915 
      efta79 |   .0964285   .0653383     1.48   0.140    -.0316391    .2244961 
      efta80 |   .1101497   .0649093     1.70   0.090    -.0170771    .2373766 
      efta81 |   .0685459   .0583549     1.17   0.240    -.0458339    .1829257 
      efta82 |   .0471566   .0762916     0.62   0.537    -.1023804    .1966935 
      efta83 |   .1031825   .0762645     1.35   0.176    -.0463013    .2526663 
      efta84 |   .0286009   .0773999     0.37   0.712    -.1231084    .1803102 
      efta85 |   .0434678   .0687695     0.63   0.527    -.0913253     .178261 
      efta86 |   -.105627   .0536888    -1.97   0.049    -.2108608   -.0003932 
      efta87 |  -.1496227   .0618185    -2.42   0.016    -.2707913   -.0284541 
      efta88 |  -.1762267    .055971    -3.15   0.002    -.2859337   -.0665197 
      efta89 |  -.1688814   .0668405    -2.53   0.012    -.2998936   -.0378693 
      efta90 |  -.2594001   .0696935    -3.72   0.000    -.3960042   -.1227959 
      efta91 |  -.2930982   .0695765    -4.21   0.000    -.4294731   -.1567234 
      efta92 |  -.1901031   .0557518    -3.41   0.001    -.2993805   -.0808256 
      efta93 |  -.0381711   .0654014    -0.58   0.559    -.1663625    .0900204 
      efta94 |  -.0759002   .0665915    -1.14   0.254    -.2064243    .0546239 
      efta95 |  -.3056477   .1524598    -2.00   0.045    -.6044795   -.0068158 
      efta96 |  -.1819294   .1647834    -1.10   0.270    -.5049165    .1410577 
      efta97 |  -.0804467   .2135651    -0.38   0.706    -.4990494     .338156 
      efta98 |  -.1720366   .1487178    -1.16   0.247    -.4635339    .1194607 
      efta99 |  -.3422524   .1376568    -2.49   0.013    -.6120694   -.0724353 
      efta00 |  -.5108373   .1406222    -3.63   0.000    -.7864666   -.2352079 
      efta01 |  -.4221561   .1806099    -2.34   0.019    -.7761643   -.0681479 
      efta02 |  -.6009564   .1425418    -4.22   0.000    -.8803485   -.3215644 
      efta03 |  -.5883034   .1509159    -3.90   0.000    -.8841092   -.2924976 
      efta04 |   -.554964   .1215635    -4.57   0.000     -.793237   -.3166909 
efta_noeft62 |   .2239863   .1138002     1.97   0.049     .0009299    .4470427 
efta_noeft63 |   .1574246   .1005356     1.57   0.117    -.0396323    .3544814 
efta_noeft64 |    .135487    .101154     1.34   0.180    -.0627821    .3337561 
efta_noeft65 |   .1498069   .0891194     1.68   0.093    -.0248734    .3244873 
efta_noeft66 |   .1984348    .082447     2.41   0.016     .0368328    .3600369 
efta_noeft67 |   .0907614   .0704714     1.29   0.198    -.0473676    .2288903 
efta_noeft68 |   .0153509   .0678507     0.23   0.821    -.1176412    .1483429 
efta_noeft69 |   .0940412   .0677731     1.39   0.165    -.0387989    .2268813 
efta_noeft70 |   .1258724   .0739566     1.70   0.089    -.0190877    .2708325 
efta_noeft71 |   .1536642   .0680014     2.26   0.024     .0203766    .2869517 
efta_noeft72 |   .1448802   .0563214     2.57   0.010     .0344864    .2552741 
efta_noeft73 |   .1299309   .0610429     2.13   0.033     .0102826    .2495792 
efta_noeft74 |   .1667583   .0587668     2.84   0.005     .0515713    .2819453 
efta_noeft75 |   .1863768   .0655574     2.84   0.004     .0578796     .314874 
efta_noeft76 |   .0903439   .0530991     1.70   0.089    -.0137342     .194422 
efta_noeft77 |   .1081027   .0521825     2.07   0.038     .0058213    .2103841 
efta_noeft78 |   .0354991    .053365     0.67   0.506       -.0691    .1400982 
efta_noeft79 |   .0124665   .0510963     0.24   0.807    -.0876858    .1126188 
efta_noeft80 |   .1033183   .0587591     1.76   0.079    -.0118536    .2184902   - 44 -
efta_noeft81 |   .0624266   .0511193     1.22   0.222    -.0377708    .1626239 
efta_noeft82 |   .0611456   .0564819     1.08   0.279    -.0495629    .1718541 
efta_noeft83 |    .123478   .0526769     2.34   0.019     .0202276    .2267284 
efta_noeft84 |   .0132447   .0513634     0.26   0.797    -.0874311    .1139205 
efta_noeft85 |   .0320598   .0514677     0.62   0.533    -.0688206    .1329401 
efta_noeft86 |   .0804657   .0451946     1.78   0.075    -.0081189    .1690504 
efta_noeft87 |   .1129471   .0482405     2.34   0.019     .0183923     .207502 
efta_noeft88 |   .0574236   .0495028     1.16   0.246    -.0396053    .1544525 
efta_noeft89 |  -.0075183    .062232    -0.12   0.904    -.1294975    .1144608 
efta_noeft90 |  -.0901653   .0600401    -1.50   0.133    -.2078481    .0275175 
efta_noeft91 |  -.0114362   .0451892    -0.25   0.800    -.1000102    .0771378 
efta_noeft92 |  -.0110227   .0482145    -0.23   0.819    -.1055264    .0834811 
efta_noeft93 |   .0061782   .0490133     0.13   0.900    -.0898912    .1022477 
efta_noeft94 |   .0146065    .050634     0.29   0.773    -.0846396    .1138526 
efta_noeft95 |  -.1358321   .0703048    -1.93   0.053    -.2736346    .0019703 
efta_noeft96 |  -.1529722   .0654182    -2.34   0.019    -.2811964    -.024748 
efta_noeft97 |  -.1400763   .0614762    -2.28   0.023    -.2605739   -.0195787 
efta_noeft98 |  -.0657979   .0630185    -1.04   0.296    -.1893186    .0577229 
efta_noeft99 |  -.1456813   .0629309    -2.31   0.021    -.2690303   -.0223324 
efta_noeft00 |   -.227286   .0706237    -3.22   0.001    -.3657135   -.0888585 
efta_noeft01 |   -.273825   .0690684    -3.96   0.000    -.4092039    -.138446 
efta_noeft02 |  -.3500982   .0681626    -5.14   0.000    -.4837017   -.2164947 
efta_noeft03 |  -.3134187   .0680785    -4.60   0.000    -.4468574   -.1799801 
efta_noeft04 |  -.2691474    .084883    -3.17   0.002     -.435524   -.1027708 
          y2 |  -.1155945   .0887953    -1.30   0.193    -.2896396    .0584506 
          y3 |  -.2744622   .0863273    -3.18   0.001    -.4436698   -.1052546 
          y4 |  -.4175732   .0857592    -4.87   0.000    -.5856672   -.2494791 
          y5 |   -.555407   .0881174    -6.30   0.000    -.7281233   -.3826906 
          y6 |  -.6584813     .08381    -7.86   0.000    -.8227547   -.4942078 
          y7 |  -.7114109   .0784795    -9.06   0.000    -.8652363   -.5575855 
          y8 |  -.8950086   .0840509   -10.65   0.000    -1.059754    -.730263 
          y9 |  -1.013887   .0867204   -11.69   0.000    -1.183865   -.8439094 
         y10 |  -1.245169   .0829848   -15.00   0.000    -1.407825   -1.082513 
         y11 |  -1.483166   .0845906   -17.53   0.000    -1.648969   -1.317363 
         y12 |  -1.676339   .0876079   -19.13   0.000    -1.848057   -1.504621 
         y13 |  -1.762946    .093087   -18.94   0.000    -1.945403   -1.580489 
         y14 |  -2.121256   .0959391   -22.11   0.000    -2.309304   -1.933209 
         y15 |  -2.186187   .0972093   -22.49   0.000    -2.376724   -1.995649 
         y16 |   -2.33253   .0996688   -23.40   0.000    -2.527888   -2.137172 
         y17 |  -2.654709   .1069482   -24.82   0.000    -2.864335   -2.445083 
         y18 |  -2.789628   .1122338   -24.86   0.000    -3.009614   -2.569642 
         y19 |  -2.986024   .1164422   -25.64   0.000    -3.214259   -2.757789 
         y20 |  -2.909637   .1145821   -25.39   0.000    -3.134226   -2.685048 
         y21 |  -2.886004   .1133861   -25.45   0.000    -3.108249   -2.663759 
         y22 |  -2.865279   .1140062   -25.13   0.000     -3.08874   -2.641819 
         y23 |  -2.740918   .1134606   -24.16   0.000    -2.963308   -2.518527 
         y24 |  -2.756683   .1146786   -24.04   0.000    -2.981462   -2.531905 
         y25 |  -3.165714    .121772   -26.00   0.000    -3.404396   -2.927033 
         y26 |  -3.439063   .1294553   -26.57   0.000    -3.692804   -3.185321 
         y27 |  -3.632121   .1342035   -27.06   0.000     -3.89517   -3.369073 
         y28 |  -3.655045   .1354295   -26.99   0.000    -3.920496   -3.389593 
         y29 |  -3.912187   .1416229   -27.62   0.000    -4.189778   -3.634596 
         y30 |  -4.037698   .1433965   -28.16   0.000    -4.318765   -3.756631 
         y31 |   -4.16662   .1459849   -28.54   0.000     -4.45276   -3.880479 
         y32 |  -4.157309   .1447549   -28.72   0.000    -4.441039    -3.87358 
         y33 |  -4.213838    .147832   -28.50   0.000    -4.503599   -3.924077 
         y34 |  -4.326836   .1524242   -28.39   0.000    -4.625598   -4.028074 
         y35 |   -4.37831   .1536728   -28.49   0.000    -4.679519     -4.0771 
         y36 |  -4.281747   .1522707   -28.12   0.000    -4.580208   -3.983285 
         y37 |  -4.267562   .1522841   -28.02   0.000    -4.566049   -3.969074 
         y38 |  -4.326383   .1539257   -28.11   0.000    -4.628088   -4.024678 
         y39 |  -4.214991   .1529229   -27.56   0.000    -4.514731   -3.915252 
         y40 |  -4.235233   .1531349   -27.66   0.000    -4.535388   -3.935077 
         y41 |  -4.414334   .1564592   -28.21   0.000    -4.721005   -4.107663 
         y42 |  -4.697964   .1636664   -28.70   0.000    -5.018762   -4.377166 
         y43 |   -4.90741   .1691147   -29.02   0.000    -5.238887   -4.575933 
       _cons |  -71.52346   2.283555   -31.32   0.000    -75.99939   -67.04753 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Date Entering Force 
 
UK, Denmark and Ireland 
 
22 January 1972 
 




28 May 1979 
 
1 January 1981 
 
Spain and Portugal 
 
12 June 1985 
 
1 January 1986 
 
Austria, Finland and Sweden 
 
24 June 1994 
 
1 January 1995 
 
 
      Source: British Management Data Foundation (www.eurotreaties.com) 
 
 
b) Data  Sources 
 
Nominal exports  UN Comtrade database  
extracted through WITS (World Integrated Trade 
Solution, wits.wordbank.org) 
 
Index of EU integration  Constructed by author using data from Mongelli, 
Dorrucci and Agur (2005) 
 




Multilateral trade rounds 
 
www.wto.org 
Date range  1962-2004 
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Source: author’s calculations; Mongelli, Dorrucci and Agur (2005) 
 
 









































Number of WTO Members MTN yes
 Source: WTO 